

NORAD: A Model to Address Gaps in US-Mexico Security Coordination

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

NORAD: A Model to Address Gaps in US-Mexico Security Coordination, by Ms. Patti Bielling, 68 pages.

The 2007 Mérida Initiative marked a major shift in Mexico-US commitment to address transnational organized crime. The organized crime networks view international borders as opportunities, making a profit by operating both as multinational corporations and violent armies. Yet the US-Mexico boundary frustrates law enforcement and military organizations, which suffer from overlapping jurisdictions and competing authorities. This monograph proposes the US-Canada organization of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) as a model for a US-Mexico body to coordinate the law enforcement and military means across borders and across agencies.

This monograph explores the development of US security relationships with both its North American neighbors to the north and south, examining how the countries overcame historical social and economic frictions, how the nature of the threat shaped the formation of their existing security cooperation institutions, and proposes the NORAD model as an institutional solution to better coordinate Mexico-US means to address the threat of transnational organized crime.

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Acronyms

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

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Introduction

Mexico's dynamic evolution toward democracy remains a hidden success story to most people in the United States.¹ The Mexican government's incremental legislative and election reforms since 1977 paved the way for the historic 2000 election of Vicente Fox and the country's first peaceful democratic transition of presidential power after seventy-one years of single-party rule.² These reforms continue today. In 2013, the country's three major political parties came together in an unprecedented move and signed the Pact for Mexico, a joint agenda to affect a broad range of labor, education, tax, and economic reforms.³ These efforts are bearing fruit. Although widespread poverty still exists, Mexico is no longer a poor country.⁴ In just a few decades, Mexican society has experienced the rise of a middle class that is "younger, more educated, wealthier, [and] healthier"⁵ than any previous generation, attaining a status that took more than a century to achieve in Europe when industrialization created the first modern middle classes. Internationally, Mexico now assumes a greater role on the world stage. The Mexican government asserts more leadership in Latin America, negotiated favorable terms in the Transpacific Partnership trade deal, and now sends military observers and specialists to participate in United

¹ Michael Werz, "Mexico's Hidden Success Story," Center for American Progress, June 28, 2012, accessed January 17, 2016, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2012/06/28/11660/mexicos-hidden-success-story/>.

² Lisa Guáqueta and Kristin Foringer, "The Evolution of Democracy in Mexico: A Conversation with José Woldenberg," *Houston Chronicle*, May 8, 2014.

³ Juan Montes, "How Mexico Ended Political Gridlock: Stream of Deals Revives Confidence in Country's Economy," *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2013.

⁴ Luis de la Calle and Luis Rubio, *Mexico: A Middle Class Society: Poor No More, Developed Not Yet* (Washington, DC: Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2012), accessed December 3, 2015, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Mexico%20A%20Middle%20Class%20Society.pdf>.

⁵ Werz, "Mexico's Hidden Success Story."

Nations peacekeeping missions.⁶ All of these efforts help boost the country's economy and demonstrate to the world community that Mexico is a defender of international law, a promoter of free trade, a guarantor of foreign investment, and a responsible nation that champions peace.⁷

The Mexican government recognizes that to achieve its ambitious domestic and foreign policy goals while maintaining the confidence of world nations, the country must also confront transnational organized crime within its borders. Transnational crime groups in Mexico use violence in pursuit of profit rather than political change, and they see international boundaries as opportunities rather than barriers.⁸ Their cross-border profiteering ranges from fraud and peddling pirated goods to robbery, kidnapping, extortion, and human trafficking.⁹ In 2007, the governments of Mexico and the United States developed a robust plan to address this threat. The Mérida Initiative, a bilateral cooperative framework, consists of four pillars: disrupting organized criminal groups, institutionalizing the rule of law, creating a modern border, and building strong and

⁶ Francisco Reséndiz, Natalia Gómez, and Yazmín Rodríguez, "Inaugura Peña Nieto III Cumbre México-Caricom," *El Universal*, April 29, 2014; Enrique Peña Nieto, "Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations Completed," Presidencia de la República (Blog), September 12, 2015, accessed January 17, 2016, <http://www.gob.mx/presidencia/articulos/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-negotiations-completed>; "México envía ocho nuevos observadores militares y oficiales de Estado Mayor a las Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz de la ONU," Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, December 15, 2015, accessed January 17, 2016, <http://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-envia-ocho-nuevos-observadores-militares-y-oficiales-de-estado-mayor-a-las-operaciones-de-mantenimiento-de-la-paz-de-la-onu>.

⁷ "Mexico as a Global Player," *Foreign Affairs*, April 29, 2015, accessed January 17, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/country-focus/mexico-global-player>.

⁸ Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin M. Finklea, *Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 1; Paul Rexton Kan, *Cartels at War: Mexico's Drug-Fueled Violence and the Threat to U.S. National Security* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2012), 113.

⁹ "The Global Regime for Transnational Crime," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified June 25, 2013, accessed August 29, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regime-transnational-crime/p28656>; Benjamin Locks, "Extortion in Mexico: Why Mexico's Pain Won't End with the War on Drugs," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* (October 6, 2014), accessed December 14, 2015, http://yalejournal.org/article_post/extortion-in-mexico-why-mexicos-pain-wont-end-with-the-war-on-drugs/.

resilient communities.¹⁰ The United States committed more than \$2.3 billion under the initiative for security cooperation with its partner to the south.¹¹ Mexico also devotes significant national resources under its current strategy.¹² The government's multi-pronged approach included spending \$9.2 billion in 2013 for social programs and infrastructure development in addition to institutional reforms and law enforcement activities.¹³ Such a close security relationship with the United States would have been politically unacceptable in Mexico just a few short years ago. However, growing social and economic interdependence between the two countries enabled the Mexican government to put aside longstanding sovereignty concerns and allow significant US involvement in Mexico's domestic security efforts.¹⁴

To implement the Mérida Initiative, the two countries established the US-Mexico High Level Consultative Group to coordinate whole-of-government bilateral security policy, and the US-Mexico Policy Coordination Group to develop bilateral strategy.¹⁵ A variety of functional agencies on both sides of the border then employ a range of means to achieve the strategy.

¹⁰ “The Mérida Initiative—An Overview,” US Diplomatic Mission to Mexico, accessed October 14, 2015, <http://mexico.usembassy.gov/eng/ataglance/merida-initiative.html>. The Mérida Initiative originally included security assistance for seven Central America countries. In fiscal year 2010, the US Congress created a separate cooperative program for these countries, the Central America Regional Security Initiative. See <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/carsi/>.

¹¹ “The Merida Initiative—An Overview,” US Diplomatic Mission to Mexico.

¹² “Programa para la Seguridad Nacional 2014-2018,” Secretaria de Gobernacion, accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5342824&fecha=30/04/2014.

¹³ “Mexico Unveils New Security Strategy Details; Billions for Jobs, Schools in Violent Areas,” Associated Press, February 12, 2013.

¹⁴ Clare Seelke, testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, May 23, 2013, accessed October 14, 2015, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130523/100907/HHRG-113-FA07-20130523-SD001.pdf>.

¹⁵ “Third Meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Security Coordination Group-Joint Statement,” US Diplomatic Mission to Mexico, October 16, 2015, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://mexico.usembassy.gov/news-events/press/third-meeting-of-the-u.s.-mexico-security-cooperation-group-joint-statement.html>; US Government Accountability Office, *Mérida*

The scope and scale of the means they apply is substantial. Each day, Mexico's Secretario de la Defensa Nacional, employs up to 45,000 soldiers in Mexican streets and towns to confront transnational criminal networks.¹⁶ In addition, myriad local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border play a role in addressing the threat. These agencies often operate autonomously, contend with overlapping jurisdictions, and rely on separate authorities, procedures, and systems against an adversary unconstrained by jurisdictional or international boundaries (see Figure 1).¹⁷ Without a bilateral institution to coordinate these law enforcement and military means, attempts to achieve US-Mexican policy goals remain stove-piped and result in wasted effort and resources.

Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 32.

¹⁶ Carlos Benavides, "Exige general Cienfuegos justicia en caso Tlatlaya," *El Universal*, June 29, 2015.

¹⁷ Curt A. Klun, *War on Drugs: Lessons Learned from 35 Years of Fighting Asymmetric Threats—A Case Study for the Project on National Security Reform*, October 2010, 6; Kristin M. Finklea, *The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting US Law Enforcement* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2013), accessed March 4, 2016, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41927.pdf>.




Figure 1. Conceptualization of the Operational Universe of Crime and Law Enforcement

Source: Kristin M. Finklea, *The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting US Law Enforcement* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2013), accessed March 4, 2016, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41927.pdf>.

This organization contrasts with the US-Canada security cooperation structure that developed in the 1940s and 1950s. In response to the Nazi threat in Europe and the emerging Cold War, the United States and Canada created the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and the Military Cooperation Committee as standing institutions to coordinate bilateral security policy and strategy. As the Soviet threat nuclear increased, Canada and the United States soon found they lacked the ability to coordinate the “means” of continental defense—the radars, missiles, and aircraft designed to deter and defeat a nuclear attack.¹⁸ The US-Canada security cooperation structure

¹⁸ “The Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship: Backgrounder,” National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, December 4, 2014, accessed October 17, 2015, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-canada-u-s-defence-relationship/hob7hd8s>; NORAD Office of

matured in 1958 with the formation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). This binational command remains responsive to emerging threats, as exemplified by its 1981 name change to North American *Aerospace* Defense Command and the addition in 2006 of a maritime warning mission.¹⁹ This monograph seeks to demonstrate that this US-Canada institutional structure enables effective bilateral coordination of security policy, strategy, and means and, therefore, serves as a fitting model for Mexico-US security cooperation to address the threat of transnational organized crime.

From a theoretical perspective, neoliberalism asserts that such international institutions benefit member states by conferring legitimacy, enabling information sharing, reducing transaction costs, making commitments more credible, acting as focal points for coordination, and facilitating reciprocity.²⁰ Neoliberalist G. John Ikenberry proposes that, throughout history, international institutions served to bridge power asymmetries among nations. He notes that in joining institutions, more powerful states willingly accept limits on their use of power in exchange for lowering the enforcement cost of maintaining international order. Meanwhile, he asserts, less powerful member-states earn a stake in the system and gain access to policy discourse to help shape decisions.²¹ The theory of functionalism addresses how and why international institutions develop. Functionalist David Mitrany believes that modern states are losing their power to act unilaterally to address complex issues associated with economic growth, social welfare, and

History, *A Brief History of NORAD* (Colorado Springs, CO: North American Aerospace Defense Command, 2014).

¹⁹ NORAD Office of History, *A Brief History of NORAD*.

²⁰ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 42.

²¹ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 53-54.

military security.²² Institutions result, then, as states begin cooperating on small issues of mutual interest—the regulation of radio wavelengths, for example. The more citizens appreciate these services, the more they trust the institutions that enable such services. Increasing trust and legitimacy encourages state governments to create other international institutions to address broader or more sensitive interest areas such as trade, immigration, and security.²³ This functionalist theory explains the evolution of North America's bilateral social, economic, and security structures. Such institutions, according to neoliberalist theories, enable states to resolve disputes and to develop cooperative policies and strategies that help achieve shared goals.

This monograph relies on a number of sources to survey the history of US relations with its neighbors. *Mexico: A Country Study* offers a comprehensive look at Mexican history.²⁴ Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, in *Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development*, document how Mexico's democratization and development define that country's politics.²⁵ *The Structure of Canadian History*, along with a geopolitical analysis published by STRATFOR, provides a succinct overview of historical frictions between the United States and Canada.²⁶ The US Army's Center of Military History documents the US-Canada and US-Mexico security cooperation

²² Per A. Hammarlund, *Liberal Internationalism and the Decline of the State: The Thought of Richard Cobden, David Mitrany, and Kenichi Ohmae* (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 28.

²³ Hammarlund, 36.

²⁴ Tim L. Merrill and Ramón Miró, eds., *Mexico: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997).

²⁵ Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, *Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006).

²⁶ J. L. Finlay and D. N. Sprague, *The Structure of Canadian History* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1979); "The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1: The Inevitable Empire," STRATFOR Global Intelligence, July 4, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-united-states-part-1-inevitable-empire>.

frameworks from World War II through the early 1950s.²⁷ The authors Richard J. Kilroy, Abelardo Rodriguez Sumano, and Todd S. Hataley take a more contemporary look at US, Mexican, and Canadian security relationships within a social and historical context.²⁸

On the issues of sovereignty and international power dynamics, Stéphanie von Hlatky proposes that Canada and other US allies implement leveraging, hedging, and compensating strategies to protect their interests.²⁹ Donald Barry and Duane Bratt also examine Canada's strategy for managing relations with the United States. The authors posit that as Canada-US security became interdependent, the Canadian government adopted a "defense against help" approach: maintaining a sufficient level of unilateral defense capability to avoid "unwanted help"³⁰ from the United States. Sidney Weintraub analyzed how the combination of power asymmetry and proximity manifests in Mexico-US relations. Mexico's historical bilateral approach (defensive) and US past behavior toward Mexico (aggressive) have not fully disappeared, although the Mexican government has increasingly adopted more insistent positions and US policy has become less domineering.³¹

²⁷ Stanley W. Dzuiban, *Military Relations between the U.S. and Canada*, U.S. Army in World War II, Special Studies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959); Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere. The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960).

²⁸ Richard J. Kilroy Jr., Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano, and Todd S. Hataley, *North American Regional Security: A Trilateral Framework?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013).

²⁹ Stephanie von Hlatky, *American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

³⁰ Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, "Defense Against Help: Explaining Canada-U.S. Security Relations," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 38, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 63-89.

³¹ Sidney Weintraub, *Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).

Various NORAD and Canadian Armed Forces publications trace the evolution of US-Canada security institutions.³² Mainstream news articles as well as press releases from the US State Department and Mexico's Secretaría de Gobernación document the developing bilateral security cooperation structure. A number of policy research groups analyze transnational organized crime and the governmental approaches to address it. For example, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Council on Foreign Relations offer a wide array of current US-Mexico policy research.³³ The Congressional Research Service also reports frequently on US-Mexico social, economic, and security relations.³⁴ Craig A. Deare succinctly outlines the challenge he calls the “incompatible interface,” the problem of coordinating myriad agencies on both sides of the US-Mexico border with differing authorities and differing responsibilities for confronting transnational organized crime.³⁵ Similar coordination issues exist within US domestic law enforcement agencies. Curt A. Klun provides a cogent analysis of the significant cross-jurisdictional coordination problems and interagency frictions that hinder the US law enforcement community’s ability to attack the domestic and international drug trade.³⁶

³² NORAD Office of History, *A Brief History of NORAD*; The Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship: Backgrounder,” National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces; “ARCHIVED—The Permanent Joint Board on Defence,” Canadian Armed Forces, October 11, 2001, accessed October 21, 2015, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-permanent-joint-board-on-defence/> hnmx19nf.

³³ See “Mexico,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/region/mexico/ri376>; “Mexico Institute,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed January 21, 2016, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/mexico-institute>.

³⁴ “Congressional Research Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs,” Federation of American Scientists, last modified January 19, 2016, accessed January 21, 2016, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/index.html>; “Congressional Research Service Reports and Issue Briefs,” accessed January 21, 2016, <http://fpc.state.gov/c18185.htm>. The Congressional Research Service releases its reports only to Congress, but these two websites aggregate reports that Congressional members make public.

³⁵ Craig A. Deare, *U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 2009).

³⁶ Klun.

Proposals for addressing transnational organized crime fall into a three main categories: US-focused recommendations for interagency structural reforms or hardening the border; Mexico-only recommendations to address security problems in that state; and integrated approaches that include recommendations for governments on both sides of the border. Examples of a US-focused proposal include Renee Novakoff's article suggesting a US interagency fusion center to forge information from the worlds of policy, law enforcement, and intelligence to better leverage US resources domestically and internationally.³⁷ Similarly, Leon Fuerth suggests that the US law enforcement community adopt an adaptive, "system of systems" structure similar to the transnational organize crime networks they confront.³⁸ Frank O. Mora and Brian Fonseca argue that in addition to domestic structural changes, the US government should focus more effort throughout the Western Hemisphere on leveraging the power of non-state actors such as individuals, businesses, religious organizations, and social movements.³⁹

Recommendations to address the internal security situation in Mexico include a 2014 RAND Corporation study in which the authors' broad proposals include building and reforming Mexico's government institutions; providing greater education, training, and employment opportunities to the population; and increasing policy-makers' willingness to except external support, particularly from the United States.⁴⁰ Tom Malinowski and Charles O. Blaha also

³⁷ Renee Novakoff, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Insidious Threat to U.S. National Security Interests," *Prism* 5, no. 4 (2015): 135-49.

³⁸ Leon Fuerth, "Transnational Organized Crime as Complex Adaptive Behavior: Anticipatory Governance as Response" (keynote address presented at the Trans-Atlantic Dialogue: Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines, Washington, DC, June 26, 2012), 4, accessed December 28, 2015, http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/Articles/Transnational_Organized_Crime_Leon_Fuerth.pdf.

³⁹ Frank O. Mora and Brian Fonseca, "United States Policy in the Hemisphere: Influencing the State and Beyond," *Prism* 5, no. 4 (2015): 69-87.

⁴⁰ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Chad C. Serena, *Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations* (Washington, DC: Rand Corporation, 2014).

recommend similar police, justice system, and economic reforms to enable a more rapid withdrawal of military forces from internal security roles.⁴¹

Typical of the more holistic bilateral proposals is the Woodrow Wilson Center's report, *Shared Responsibility: US-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime*. The authors recommend reducing demand for narcotics through treatment and prevention in the United States; building strong law enforcement and judicial institutions in Mexico; improving intelligence-sharing and disrupting the flow of cash and arms into Mexico; and engaging US and Mexican societies to build resilient communities.⁴² Similarly, the policies of the United States and Mexico recognize that addressing the threat of transnational organized crime requires coordinated action on both sides of the border.⁴³

Finally, some authors propose a security structure that goes beyond a bilateral approach, suggesting that Mexico join NORAD.⁴⁴ However, Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley concluded that, despite converging interests among Canada, Mexico, and the United States, identity issues currently hinder the formation of a continental “regional security complex.”⁴⁵ Similarly, a 2005

⁴¹ Tom Malinowski and Charles O. Blaha, “De-Militarizing Civilian Security in Mexico and the Northern Triangle,” *Prism* 5, no. 4 (2015): 27-33. Malinowski and Blaha note that Mexican government and army recognize the military’s internal security role as a temporary one as the state continues efforts to reorganize its police forces.

⁴² Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee, eds., *Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime* (Washington, DC: Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 2010), 28-30.

⁴³ “Statement of Principles on Security and Cooperation between the Governments of the United States and Mexico,” US White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 27, 2015, accessed October 28, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/27/statement-principles-security-cooperation-between-governments-united-sta>.

⁴⁴ James Jay Carafano et al., *Expand NORAD to Improve Security in North America* (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2010); Ray Walser, *US Strategy against Mexican Drug Cartels: Flawed and Uncertain* (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, April 26, 2010).

⁴⁵ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 212.

Council on Foreign Relations report recommended ambitious goals for trilateral economic and security integration, but the governments made little, if any, progress toward achieving them.⁴⁶ Others even go as far as suggesting a North American union, but there is little public support for such political integration.⁴⁷ The failure of the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), a major trilateral initiative, also belies such an approach. Robert A. Pastor, a leading proponent of North American continentalism, notes that all three nations prefer bilateral structures. Pastor wrote that the Canadian government fears slowing down bilateral cooperative efforts as well as losing its special relationship with the United States, while the Mexican government requires US-Canada support offered in a way its domestic constituents will accept.⁴⁸ Pastor believes that the trilateral partnership failed in the United States despite favorable US public opinion because the “voices of that majority were drowned out by the 15-20 percent of the public who feel a loss of control as the forces of globalization or regionalization grow stronger, and their jobs are threatened by outsourcing, trade, and immigration.”⁴⁹ This paper therefore suggests expanding the current bilateral security cooperation framework while recognizing that continued converging interests on the continent may one day result in the formation of a North American trilateral security institution.

This monograph uses a case study approach structured around three questions. The first question springs from the need for the United States and Mexico to overcome historical frictions

⁴⁶ Council on Foreign Relations, *Building a North American Community* (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2005).

⁴⁷ Richard J. Kilroy, “Perimeter Defense and Regional Security Cooperation in North America: United States, Canada, and Mexico,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, Proceedings of the Workshop on Preparing for and Responding to Disasters in North America (December 2007), accessed January 5, 2016, <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/138>.

⁴⁸ Robert A. Pastor, *North American Idea: A Vision of a Continental Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 152-4.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 155.

that hinder effective bilateral cooperation. When envisioning the US-Canada relationship as a model, we likely think of long-term friendly relations, perhaps exemplified by the border, the longest undefended international boundary in the world.⁵⁰ One can easily forget that trust between these two neighbors did not always exist. The War of 1812 was followed by decades of US-Canada border skirmishes and incursions; it was not until 1900 that peaceful relations became the norm.⁵¹ What conditions, then, enabled the two nations to overcome these frictions and create a robust security relationship? This paper argues that the convergence of US and Canadian social, economic, and security interests that began in the early 1900s led to the formation of a range of bilateral institutions, including the robust bilateral security structure that exists today. This paper further asserts that a similar phenomenon of converging interests today is enabling the United States and Mexico to form bilateral institutions to address a range of issues.

The second question begins with recognizing that the nature of the security problem the United States and Mexico face today differs from the security problem the United States and Canada faced in the 1940s and 1950s. The insidious threat posed by modern transnational organized crime contrasts with the existential threat posed by Nazism and nuclear war. In light of such distinctive security environments, how does the nature of the threat affect the development of bilateral security structures? This paper argues that the existential nature of the threat facing the United States and Canada encouraged the relatively rapid development of a robust security cooperation institutional structure. It further proposes that the insidious nature of the transnational organized crime threat, combined with lingering sovereignty concerns, has thus far failed to create the sense of urgency needed for the governments to build a robust US-Mexico security cooperation structure.

⁵⁰ “The 49th Parallel View: How Did Canada and the U.S. Get Divvied Up That Way?,” World Atlas, June 8, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015, <http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/history-of-the-us-canada-border-the-longest-undefended-border-in-the-world.html>.

⁵¹ Dzuiban, 1.

The final question in this monograph concerns the efficacy of the existing US-Canada and US-Mexico structures to meet complex security threats. Effective efforts to address complex problems logically require the two states to coordinate policy, develop strategy, and employ means in a coordinated fashion to accomplish the strategy. Neoliberalist theories of international relations suggest that institutions serve as mechanisms to accomplish these functions. How effective are the current US-Canada and US-Mexico security frameworks at enabling the coordination of policy, the development of strategy, and the application of means? This paper shows that the nascent US-Mexico security framework currently lacks a mechanism to effectively coordinate means. Finally, this paper proposes NORAD as an institutional model to address this gap.

Before assessing the two cases using this lens of policy-strategy-means, we must examine the relationship among these concepts. This paper assumes that when state leaders pledge to work together, their governments must then arrive at shared goals through policy dialogue. The policy goals that emerge from this dialogue form the basis of bilateral strategy or, at a minimum, fairly congruent national strategic goals. Strategic goals then guide the employment of means. In its strictest interpretation, the term “strategy” describes the link between *military* action and policy as exemplified by the US-Canada case.⁵² Yet in the US-Mexico case, responding to an organized crime threat primarily involves law enforcement actions. For consistency, this paper uses the term “strategy” to encompass both law enforcement and military actions that help achieve policy. Applying the term in this broader sense comports with the US military’s *Joint Publication 3-0*’s definition of strategy, which includes the employment of all instruments of national power.⁵³ Likewise, readers should interpret the term “means” to include military force as well as the broad

⁵² Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 6.

⁵³ Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), xi. This manual defines strategy as a set of ideas for “employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national and/or multinational objectives.”

array of resources a state or institution employs to meet policy goals. Within this definitional framework, this paper uses the lens of policy-strategy-means to examine the efficacy of the bilateral security structures the United States shares with Canada and with Mexico.

Section One of this monograph focuses on the development of the US-Canada security coordination model. It examines the historical and strategic context, specifically the convergence of US and Canadian interests from 1900 and into the Cold War, as well as the emergence of a bilateral security structure to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Section One ends by analyzing how well the structure enables the coordination of bilateral security policy, strategy, and means. Section Two then explores the historical and strategic context of US-Mexico relations and their converging interests today. It examines the nature of the transnational organized crime threat and how well the emerging bilateral security structure manages the threat. Section Three concludes with a discussion of how a NORAD-like organization might help the United States and Mexico address existing gaps in coordinating policy, strategy, and means.

Section One: US-Canada Security Cooperation

The US-Canada relationship is more complex and interdependent than some may realize because of the peaceful nature of their border. The “unique partnership”⁵⁴ the two nations share arose primarily because of Canada’s strategic and economic importance to the United States national security. Canada remains the largest and most secure energy supplier to the United States; two-way trade totals \$759 billion annually, and nearly nine million US jobs depend on trade and investment with Canada.⁵⁵ The two governments collaborate closely on issues of environment and

⁵⁴ Lawrence Robert Aronsen, *American National Security and Economic Relations with Canada, 1945-1954* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), xvi.

⁵⁵ Gary Doer, “Message from the Ambassador,” Embassy of Canada in Washington, July 24, 2015, accessed December 17, 2015, http://can-am.gc.ca/washington/offices-bureaux/hom_message_cdm.aspx?lang=eng.

water management, counterterrorism, air and maritime security, public health, emergency management, critical infrastructure protection, and cyber security.⁵⁶ However, bilateral relations were much less friendly in the 1800s. What conditions enabled the United States and Canada to overcome historical frictions to create a robust security cooperation relationship? Answering this question requires an examination of US-Canadian history.

From Conflict to Converging Interests

Canada's history has been one of balancing its political relationships with Great Britain and with the United States.⁵⁷ Canada wished to remain neutral in the US Revolutionary War of the 1770s, but the Continental Army invaded Quebec in an effort to convince its northern neighbors to ally with them against Britain. A humiliating defeat in Montreal ended that aspiration for the attackers, and forty-five thousand British loyalists fled north from the thirteen rebelling colonies, creating a counterrevolutionary movement in British Canada.⁵⁸ The United States again attacked Montreal in the War of 1812. However, upon Napoleon's defeat, Britain disentangled itself from European conflicts and sent more troops and ships to North America. By 1814, the North American war reached a stalemate, New England threatened secession, and Napoleon's revival loomed in Europe, making both Britain and the United States eager to end hostilities. The Treaty of Ghent restored the antebellum boundaries on the continent, and other sources of major conflict faded as US settlements pushed Native tribes further west and the Canadian fur trade shifted northwest.⁵⁹ The Napoleonic Wars in Europe exhausted the French and British, thus limiting their

⁵⁶ "US Relations with Canada Fact Sheet," US Department of State, August 5, 2015, accessed December 17, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm>.

⁵⁷ H. F. Angus, ed., *Canada and Her Great Neighbor: Sociological Surveys of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada Concerning the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 3-4.

⁵⁸ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 43.

⁵⁹ Roger Riendeau, *A Brief History of Canada* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2000), 93.

subsequent involvement in North America. An uneasy political dynamic emerged in the post-war period:

“For their part, the Americans were mobilized, angry and—remembering vividly the Canadian/British sacking of Washington—mulling revenge. This left a geographically and culturally fractured Canada dreading a long-term, solitary confrontation with a hostile and strengthening local power. During the following decades, the Canadians had little choice but to downgrade their ties to the increasingly disinterested British Empire, adopt political neutrality vis-a-vis Washington, and begin formal economic integration with the United States. Any other choice would have put the Canadians on the path to another war with the Americans (this time likely without the British), and that war could have had only one outcome.”⁶⁰

Subsequent negotiations established the 49th Parallel as the western boundary between the two North American territories, limited armed vessels on the Great Lakes, and clarified Atlantic fishing rights. Through the end of the 1800s, various policy disputes developed and a number of disagreements arose over the boundary in the west. During this fractious post-bellum period, the two nations embarked on the most active fort-building period in Canadian history.⁶¹ The United States concentrated its defensive preparations along two fronts: the Canadian border and the Atlantic seaboard, where British ships of war could freely range. In one luckless incident, the United States spent three years and more than one hundred thousand dollars building the most formidable US fortification to date to secure Lake Champlain. Construction halted in 1818 when a boundary survey determined that the US government built the fortifications three quarters of a mile too far north—in Canadian territory.⁶² A dispute over Oregon in the 1840s led Canada to build defensive works in Kingston and Halifax, and the US Civil War of the 1860s led Canada to erect forts south of the St. Lawrence River to reinforce Quebec.⁶³ Despite such frictions, a shared

⁶⁰ STRATFOR Global Intelligence.

⁶¹ C. P. Stacey, “The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871,” *American Historical Review* 56, no. 1 (October 1950): 4.

⁶² Ibid., 5-6.

⁶³ Ibid., 15-16.

preference emerged to resolve contentious US-Canada issues through bilateral negotiation. This preference for “negotiated settlement and mutual accommodation”⁶⁴ remained even after Canada achieved independence from Britain, resulting in enduring peace between the two neighbors and, eventually, the longest undefended border in the world.

The inclination toward mutual accommodation also helped foster economic integration. In 1849, the British abandoned mercantilism in favor of free trade and removed tariffs that protected Canadian imports. These actions had the intended effect of reducing consumer prices in Britain but also led to greater North American economic integration. In the United States, exports increased and the economy surged throughout the mid-1800s thanks to newly opened British markets. However, Canada’s economy worsened without British policies protecting Canadian imports, and migration to the United States increased.⁶⁵ To help address the deteriorating Canadian economy, the British governor-general in Canada sought trade negotiations with the United States. Canada conceded inland fisheries, and the United States allowed free entry of products ranging from fish to coal, flour to lumber. Perhaps as important, Canadians received, if not real benefits, the psychological comfort of trade reciprocity with the United States following the loss of British protectionist policies.⁶⁶ By the late 1800s, some Canadians called for unrestricted trade reciprocity with the United States, and the Liberal Party in the late 1800s ran on a national platform advocating commercial union with the United States. However, in a sign of lingering distrust of US intentions, Canadian majorities elected a Conservative government that appealed to popular sovereignty concerns and called such liberal proposals “virtual treason.”⁶⁷ Rhetoric

⁶⁴ Riendeau, 92-93; Stacey, 1-18.

⁶⁵ Finlay and Sprague, 137-142.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 144.

⁶⁷ Kevin Armitage, “Canada-US Integration in the 21st Century: A Canadian Perspective” (master’s thesis, Western University, 2010-2011), 8, accessed January 23, 2016, http://cas.uwo.ca/research/grads_2011.html.

notwithstanding, bilateral trade and cooperation increased after the turn of the century with the 1904 opening of a Ford plant in Ontario, marking the start of US and Canadian industrial expansion.⁶⁸

The preference for mutual accommodation soon led the two governments to create several important bilateral institutions. To settle US-Canada boundary disputes, the two nations formed the International Joint Commission in 1909.⁶⁹ The success of this commission soon led to the creation of several other organizations to study or adjudicate issues of mutual concern, among them the International Fisheries Commission, the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, and the Great Lakes Fisheries Board of Inquiry.⁷⁰

Economic integration continued during the early years of World War I. The war consumed Europe's resources, reducing British foreign investment and creating opportunities in Canada for US capital. By 1916, the United States purchased sixty-five percent of Canadian bonds, and US direct foreign investment in Canadian industry increased from twenty-three percent in 1914 to fifty percent by 1922.⁷¹ Thus, the United States surpassed Britain as Canada's largest foreign investor.

Meanwhile, the growth of transportation networks made the border increasingly permeable, allowing greater migration and cultural exchange.⁷² Geography also shaped transportation networks within Canada and encouraged greater economic integration with the United States. The lack of naturally navigable rivers and rugged western terrain geographically

⁶⁸ Justin Thompson, "The Canada-U.S. Saga: A Timeline," CBC News, May 1, 2003, accessed December 3, 2015, <http://www.cbc.ca/canadaus/timeline.html>.

⁶⁹ "IJC Mission and Mandates," International Joint Commission (IJC), 2015, accessed October 17, 2015, http://www.ijc.org/en/_IJC_Mandates.

⁷⁰ Dzuiban, 27.

⁷¹ Armitage.

⁷² Ohio State University Department of History, "Asymmetry, Interdependence, and Ambiguity," ehistory, accessed December 10, 2015, <https://ehistory.osu.edu/exhibitions/arctic-sovereignty/asymmetry>.

sequestered the few Canadian population centers from one another and encouraged development of north-south corridors to the United States, “where transport is cheaper, the climate supports a larger population, and markets are more readily accessible.”⁷³ Closer social and trade relations between border cities such as Halifax and Boston, Montreal and New York, now meant that some of the most important regional economies spanned the US-Canada border.⁷⁴

Thus, the once-feuding nations established preferences for cooperation in the social and economic realms, resulting in agencies such as the International Joint Commission. This body ultimately would serve as the model for the Canada-US security cooperation institutions.

Increasing security cooperation

To better understand the development of the US-Canada security cooperation model, this monograph examines how the nature of the threat affected the resulting security structure. By the 1930s, the growing threat of National Socialism in Europe created both the need and the impetus for increased bilateral security cooperation. Before that time, geographic isolation meant the North Americans needed neither large standing armies nor defense relationships.⁷⁵ In response to Nazi aggression in Europe, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt made public pledges in 1936 and 1938 that the United States would defend Canada against foreign aggression.⁷⁶ In return, Canadian

⁷³ STRATFOR Global Intelligence.

⁷⁴ Stephen Blank and Barry Prentice, “Canada-US Transportation and Corridor Policies,” in *Borders and Bridges: Canada’s Policy Relations in North America*, ed. Monica Gattinger and Geoffrey Hale (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 5.

⁷⁵ Dzuiban, 2. Despite lacking a formal defense relationship, the United States and Canada collaborated during World War I in the areas of military equipping, armaments, recruiting, and training.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 3-4.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King promised that “enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea, or air to the United States across Canadian territory.”⁷⁷

Canada entered World War II along with Great Britain in September 1939, but by the spring of 1940, the governments in Ottawa and Washington began giving serious thought to the consequences of German victory in Europe. In April 1940, historian Shelagh Grant writes, King met with Roosevelt in his swimming pool in Warm Springs, Georgia, where the two leaders agreed to a “principle of mutual cooperation in the defense of North America while basking in the warm waters, stark naked except for little belly bands.”⁷⁸ In July 1940, German bombs began falling in Britain, creating a greater sense of urgency in the minds of the US and Canadian leaders. One Canadian defense policy advisor described the existential threat posed by a Nazis conquest of the British Isles:

To those whose knowledge was most complete it was correspondingly apparent that if the Germans were able to land in force, the almost unarmed soldiers and civilians of Britain could not long maintain an effective defence. The collapse of British resistance would almost certainly be followed by demands on the nations of the New World for co-operation with the fascist powers. Rejection of these demands would invite early attack. Acceptance would mean the betrayal of the spiritual, social, political, and economic ideals which, though frequently honoured more in breach than in observance, were still the hallmarks of North American democracy.⁷⁹

It was under this cloud that Roosevelt and King met August 17, 1940, in the US president’s private railway car in Ogdensburg, New York. The two men agreed to establish the Permanent Joint Board on Defense as the senior policy advisory body on continental defense with the near-term goal of studying sea, land, and air defense issues for the northern half of the Western

⁷⁷ John J. Noble, “Defending the United States and Canada, in North America and Abroad,” *Policy Options*, May 1, 2005.

⁷⁸ Shelagh Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950* (Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 1989), 59.

⁷⁹ H. L. Keenleyside, “The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945,” *International Journal* 16, no. 1 (Winter 1960/1961), 51.

Hemisphere.⁸⁰ The two leaders promptly appointed members, and the board met August 26, 1940.⁸¹

The “permanent” designation signified that the leaders intended the structure to outlast the war, a de facto acknowledgment of the increasingly interdependent nature of the security relationship.⁸² The two nations modeled the new defense board on the International Joint Commission, the well-liked boundary adjudication body and perhaps the most successful and trusted US-Canadian agency of the time.⁸³ The formation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense pleased Canadians of all stripes—academics, foreign policy experts, and members of the public—who called for their government to pursue a formal joint defense understanding with the United States in part because of the real possibility of a British downfall and in part because they believed continental defense was inevitable and thus Canada should take steps to shape it.⁸⁴ A group of Canadians belonging to the Institute of International Affairs proposed the following in 1940:

While self-respect demands that Canadians conduct their own defense as much as possible, the United States will, in order to protect herself, insist on intervening at once if Canada is attacked or threatened—particularly if she is not sure of Canada's strategy and strength. Therefore, Canada's best chance of maintaining her national existence is the frank admission from the beginning that her defense must be worked out in cooperation with the United States, on the basis of a single continental defense policy. The emphasis must therefore be on continental effort rather than on national effort.⁸⁵

In an attempt to balance security and sovereignty concerns, these prominent Canadians also urged pragmatic measures to make the defense arrangement as advantageous to Canada as

⁸⁰ Dzuibán, 24.

⁸¹ Keenleyside, 53.

⁸² Dzuibán, 26.

⁸³ Grant, 57-59.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 59.

⁸⁵ Conn and Fairchild, 368.

possible, including political and financial agreements and closer collaboration between the two general staffs.⁸⁶ Sovereignty concerns arose during the war years with the employment of significant numbers of US forces on Canadian soil to man the Northeast Staging Route to Europe and construct the Alaska-Canada Highway.⁸⁷ The Canadian government accepted that these deployments occurred in good faith but obtained guarantees that the United States would withdraw its troops before the war's end. Canada also sought more formalized security cooperation agreements with the United States to prevent similar encroachments in the future.⁸⁸ Historian Grant explains the postwar dynamic: "...the traditional fear of American encroachment increased and decreased in an inverse relationship to the perceived threat of Soviet aggression. When the need for security against an alien aggressor became paramount, the objective to guarantee security rights was superseded, a pattern which had precedent in the war years."⁸⁹ Nonetheless, the construction of the Alaska-Canada Highway—along with shared production of military equipment, increased joint training and operations, and early efforts toward military interoperability—further institutionalized US-Canada military collaboration.⁹⁰ Concurrently, collaboration on military technology, including a defense manufacturing agreement that set the course for industrial defense

⁸⁶ Conn and Fairchild, 368.

⁸⁷ Philippe Lagassé, "Northern Command and the Evolution of US-Canada Defence Relations," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003), accessed December 23, 2015, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo4/no1/policy-police-01-eng.asp>.

⁸⁸ Lagassé.

⁸⁹ Shelagh D. Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950* (Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 160, quoted in Michael T. Fawcett, "The Politics of Sovereignty—Continental Defence and the Creation of NORAD," *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 2 (2010): 33-40.

⁹⁰ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 65.

cooperation, deepened economic interdependence.⁹¹ Even today, Canadian and US firms can bid on the military contracts of both nations.⁹²

The two countries remained committed to security cooperation during the Cold War. With the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union, the US and Canadian governments recognized the need for a mechanism to develop and coordinate postwar defense strategy for North America.⁹³ The Military Cooperation Committee, formed in 1946, included representatives of the military service departments, the US State Department, and the Canadian Department of External Affairs.⁹⁴ The body did not supplant day-to-day military liaison activities, which still occurred through the service attachés in the two capitals.⁹⁵ Rather, the group focused on preparing, continuously revising, and submitting recommendations for the implementation of various security plans.

Through the 1950s, Soviet technologies improved and fear of nuclear war heightened. The Canadian government recognized its population was too sparse to defend its expansive territory.⁹⁶ The United States worked with Canada to emplace early warning radar systems deeper in the northern territory to ensure sufficient advance notice of an airborne attack. As they built more aircraft, the two governments saw the need to rapidly synchronize alert measures to provide a coordinated response to a Soviet incursion.⁹⁷ The two militaries envisioned a joint command to

⁹¹ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 65.

⁹² David T. Jones, “Canada and the United States: Civil Military Relations,” *American Diplomacy*, June 7, 2010, accessed January 23, 2016, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0406/comm/jones_canada10.html.

⁹³ Lagassé.

⁹⁴ Dzuiban, 336.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ James Thompson, *Making North America: Trade, Security, and Integration* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 114.

⁹⁷ Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 31.

coordinate the assets of the Royal Canadian and US Air Forces and, in 1958, the United States and Canada established NORAD.⁹⁸ The command evolved over time as the security environment changed, and NORAD now responds to potential airborne threats originating within North America and performs aerospace and maritime warning missions.⁹⁹

Balancing Sovereignty and Security

The joint Canada-US participation in the war forged a unique relationship and a mutual agreement to build a long-term security commitment that respected the integrity and sovereignty of the other.¹⁰⁰ Sovereignty, however, remained a postwar concern for Canada. In an effort to protect its self-determination, the Canadian government ensured the binational NORAD agreement sufficiently constrained the United States from unilateral action. Although the agreement readily passed the Canadian House of Commons, eight members “with a visceral distrust of American military power”¹⁰¹ still voted against it. Since 1958, the two governments renewed the NORAD agreement nine times, finally making it permanent in 2006.¹⁰² To mitigate power asymmetry with the United States, Canada leverages a “defense against help” strategy. In the end, this resource-maximizing approach benefits both nations. Canada maintains a sufficient unilateral defense capability to assure the United States that its northern approaches are secure. Canada thus avoids

⁹⁸ Lagassé.

⁹⁹ NORAD Office of History, *A Brief History of NORAD*.

¹⁰⁰ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 66.

¹⁰¹ Jockel, 35.

¹⁰² “U.S., Canada, Strengthen NORAD Agreement,” North American Aerospace Defense Command, May 23, 2006, accessed January 28, 2016, <http://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/tabid/3170/Article/578134/us-canada-strengthen-norad-agreement.aspx>. The agreement remains subject to review every four years or at the request of either government.

“unwanted help.”¹⁰³ In return, the United States expends significant resources for radars and other technology and receives permission to emplace them on Canadian soil to protect both nations.

In the post-9/11 world, US security needs continue to influence Canadian defense policy.¹⁰⁴ The special relationship with the United States gives Canadian defense officials “an influential voice”¹⁰⁵ in US defense policy formulation in areas of mutual interest. Canada also benefits as its military gains access to defense-related information, training, and operational experiences, and Canadian businesses benefit from access to important technologies and the lucrative US defense market.¹⁰⁶ Thus, this analysis shows that the existential threat of World War II and the Cold War led to the relatively rapid development of a robust security cooperation institutional structure that benefits both nations. To mitigate power asymmetries inherent in the relationship, Canada adopted a resource-maximizing strategy to shape the institutional structures and achieve a balance between security and sovereignty.

Assessing the security cooperation model

The final question this case study considers is how effectively the current US-Canada security structure enables the coordination of security policy, strategy, and means. To answer this question, this paper examines each structural level in turn, beginning with the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. The United States and Canada created this body in 1940 to manage the political defense relationship and coordinate defense policy, with each nation having an equal say.¹⁰⁷ Members include a mix of civilian political officials and senior military leaders, with each of the

¹⁰³ Barry and Bratt, 63-89.

¹⁰⁴ Lagassé.

¹⁰⁵ Barry and Bratt, 63-89.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Dzuiban, 26.

two national sections chaired by a civilian. The board remains advisory in nature, with each country's chairman reporting directly to their respective political leaders, making the organization a powerful instrument for policy development.¹⁰⁸ During its first three years, the board met nearly every month, which "gave the civilian members an opportunity to check on the progress being made in the implementation of decisions which, in some cases, had been reached against service objections."¹⁰⁹ The group discussed matters until they reached consensus. Interestingly, most divisions of opinion occurred along service lines rather than national lines.¹¹⁰ Since the end of World War II, the Permanent Joint Board advised on nearly all important joint defense measures, including the installation of early warning radars, the adoption of an underwater acoustic surveillance system, the creation of NORAD, and modernization of North American air defense.¹¹¹ Today, its members confer biannually on important joint defense issues of policy, operations, finance, and logistics, submitting recommendations to the two governments for approval.¹¹² After the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, board membership expanded to include representatives of the US Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety Canada.¹¹³ Perhaps equally important, the forum serves as an alternate channel of communication to more rapidly resolve difficult policy issues, such as cost-sharing in the face of declining budgets, and acts as a "valuable forum for the expression of national interests and for frank exchanges that allow discussion of the full spectrum of security and defence issues."¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁸ Peter T. Haydon, "A Tale of Two Navies: Building the Canada-United States Cold War Naval Relationship," *The Northern Mariner* 24, no. 3 (July and October 2014), 179.

¹⁰⁹ Keenleyside, 54.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 55.

¹¹¹ Canadian Armed Forces.

¹¹² National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Canadian Armed Forces.

Security coordination during the war occurred via national channels through the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹¹⁵ To meet the postwar need for area defense planning, the United States and Canada formed the Military Cooperation Committee in 1946. The Military Cooperation Committee served as the direct link between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend and coordinate joint defense planning. The first act of the newly formed committee was crafting a plan to implement a set of post-war joint defense principles established by the Permanent Joint Board.¹¹⁶ The principles guaranteed sovereignty while providing the basis for broad binational cooperation in accordance with limits either country might impose. The principles included defense collaboration, exchange of personnel, joint maneuver exercises, developing and testing of materiel, increased standardization, reciprocal use of military facilities, and “no impairment of control by each country over all activities in its own territory.”¹¹⁷ These arrangements offered strategic flexibility that “allowed for increasing amounts of collaboration as the two countries began to accept the inescapable conclusion that the Soviet post-war strategy left no alternative but to broaden the defensive collaboration designed to guard North America from Soviet aggression.”¹¹⁸ The committee also devised the Basic Security Plan, which called for a “comprehensive continental air defence organization, cartography, air and surface surveillance to provide early warning of attack, anti-submarine and coastal defense, counter-lodgements plans, and a joint command structure.”¹¹⁹ Committee members updated the plan regularly based on joint

¹¹⁵ Sean M. Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 4.

¹¹⁶ Dzuiban, 338.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 338-339.

¹¹⁹ Lagassé.

intelligence estimates produced by the intelligence subcommittees of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and the Military Cooperation Committee.¹²⁰

In the 1950s, Soviet nuclear attack capability improved, narrowing the time window to detect an imminent attack. In response, the militaries of the United States and Canada required trained forces that could rapidly react under a single commander and fight in a coordinated air battle.¹²¹ As long as forces functioned independently at the operational level, the US and Canadian air forces sacrificed efficiency and effectiveness.¹²² To improve close operational coordination, the two governments established NORAD, a joint command to conduct aerospace warning and aerospace control of North America. A US commander heads NORAD with a Canadian deputy. To alleviate sovereignty concerns, each nation retained national command over its own units, managing their training, discipline, stationing, and logistics.¹²³ This structure, conceptualized in Figure 2, enables Canada and the United States to effectively coordinate policy, strategy, and means, giving each nation an equal voice while respecting international sovereignty. With the Canada-US case study complete, this monograph now examines the Mexico-US history and the growth of the current security cooperation relationship.

¹²⁰ Maloney, 5.

¹²¹ Jockel, 20.

¹²² Lagassé.

¹²³ Ibid.




Figure 2. Conceptualization of Canada-US Security Coordination Structure

Source: Created by author.

Section Two: US-Mexico Security Cooperation

Mexico-US interdependence has grown to the point that perhaps no other nation affects the United States and its citizens as much on a day-to-day basis.¹²⁴ About one million US citizens reside in Mexico and more than 33 million Hispanics of Mexican descent live in the United States.¹²⁵ Mexico buys more US products than any nation except Canada, and one in every twenty-

¹²⁴ Shannon K. O'Neil, "U.S.-Mexico Initiative," *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed August 29, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/projects/world/us-mexico-initiative/pr1487>.

¹²⁵ Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and Mark Hugo Lopez, "A Demographic Portrait of Mexican-Origin Hispanics in the United States," *Pew Research Center's Hispanic Trends Project*, May 1, 2013, accessed August 28, 2015, <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/05/01/a-demographic-portrait-of-mexican-origin-hispanics-in-the-united-states/>.

four US workers depends on trade with Mexico.¹²⁶ The agendas of the US and Mexican governments overlap now more than ever before.¹²⁷ The two nations boast new intergovernmental organizations to coordinate higher education, research, entrepreneurship and innovation, border modernization, and repatriation strategy and policy.¹²⁸ These new initiatives complement long-standing cross-border cooperation on environmental issues, natural resources, telecommunications, and public health.¹²⁹

One sees the same interdependencies reflected in the problem of transnational organized crime. The United States is the world's largest consumer of illegal narcotics, while economic conditions and underdeveloped legal and judicial systems in Mexico have allowed the country to become a major producer and transit route for drugs.¹³⁰ In recent years, drug trafficking organizations grew more violent and diversified their activities to include extortion, robbery, piracy, kidnapping and human smuggling.¹³¹ From 2006 to 2012, an estimated 80,000 people died in Mexico from drug-related violence.¹³²

¹²⁶ Christopher E. Wilson, *Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico* (Washington, DC: Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 9-17.

¹²⁷ Levy and Bruhn, 201.

¹²⁸ William H. Duncan, "Ambassador's Remarks at the July 4 Official Reception," United States Diplomatic Mission to Mexico, July 2, 2015, accessed November 12, 2015, http://mexico.usembassy.gov/eng/ebio_ambassador/texts/ambassadors-remarks-at-the-july-4-official-reception3.html.

¹²⁹ "U.S. Relations with Mexico Fact Sheet," US Department of State, May 8, 2015, accessed November 12, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm>.

¹³⁰ Alberto Díaz-Cayeros and Andrew Selee, "Mexico and the United States: The Possibilities of Partnership," The Dynamics of U.S.-Mexico Relations, April 21, 2010, accessed January 18, 2016, https://www.academia.edu/2562506/The_Dynamics_of_U.S.-Mexico_Relations.

¹³¹ Steven Dudley, *Transnational Crime in Mexico and Central America: Its Evolution and Role in International Migration* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012), 5.

¹³² "Mexico Drug War Fast Facts," CNN.com, January 26, 2016, accessed February 2, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/>.

In recent years, the United States and Mexico committed to work together to meet the threat posed by violent transnational crime. The two governments enacted the 2007 Mérida Initiative, a cooperative framework that guides bilateral efforts to disrupt organized crime groups, institutionalize the rule of law, create a modern border, and build strong and resilient communities.¹³³ Reaching this unprecedented level of cooperation required the United States and Mexico to overcome significant political frictions rooted in their shared history. What conditions enabled the two nations to overcome their once frosty relationship and adopt a combined approach for addressing this threat?

From conflict to cooperation

Descending from very different colonial heritages, the United States and Mexico had little interaction before the 1800s.¹³⁴ Their often stormy post-1800 history is “largely ignored north of the border and perhaps excessively recalled to its south.”¹³⁵ For example, the *Museo Nacional de las Intervenciones* opened in 1980 in Mexico City to commemorate “northern” and other foreign interventions in Mexican history, and virtually every Mexican school child learns the key dates of US interventions against Mexican sovereignty.¹³⁶ Perhaps the best recalled US intervention began in the 1830s and ultimately resulted in Mexico losing more than half its territory to the United States. The 1835 uprising of Anglo settlers in the Mexican territory of Tejas drew US volunteers to support their cause. The dispute led to the Mexican-American War and the occupation of Mexico City by the army of US general Winfield Scott. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the

¹³³ “The Mérida Initiative—An Overview.”

¹³⁴ Levy and Bruhn, 181.

¹³⁵ Deare, 1.

¹³⁶ Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., *U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging Future* (Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press, 2010), 8; and Deare, 1.

war, and the 1854 Gadsden Purchase solidified the current US-Mexico boundary. Mexico ceded lands comprising modern-day California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and parts of Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming.¹³⁷ These territorial losses and the “brief but traumatic occupation of Mexico City by US troops engendered a deep-seated mistrust of the United States that still resonates in Mexican popular culture...and continues to manifest itself in some aspects of Mexican society.”¹³⁸ Racial conflict continued after the war for decades along the border. William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb studied vigilantism perpetrated against Mexicans from 1848 until the late 1920s. They confirmed through historical documents the names of 547 Mexicans lynched by white mobs, but the researchers estimate the actual number may be in the thousands.¹³⁹

In the mid-1800s, Mexico also suffered threats of intervention from Spain, Great Britain, and France.¹⁴⁰ French troops occupied Mexico City in 1863, but the United States, focusing on its own conflict, did nothing until the US Civil War ended 1865. The United States then sided with Benito Juárez and his Mexican liberal forces against the French-backed Mexican elites who installed a Hapsburg on the throne. The monarchy collapsed when Napoleon III, facing threats in Europe, withdrew French troops in 1866.¹⁴¹ A series of liberal republican governments in Mexico attempted economic and educational reforms, but no leader effectively controlled the Mexican state until Porfirio Díaz consolidated power in 1876 and established a thirty-five year reign of internal peace and political stability. For the first time in the country’s history, Mexico began developing an identity as an independent nation-state.¹⁴² These political achievements, however,

¹³⁷ Merrill and Miró.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, *Forgotten Dead: Mob Violence against Mexicans in the United States, 1848-1928* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5.

¹⁴⁰ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 53.

¹⁴¹ Merrill and Miró, 29-31.

¹⁴² Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 54.

came at a cost high in human lives. Despite democratic aspirations, the Díaz regime was a military dictatorship that accomplished its ambitious modernization agenda at the expense of personal and political freedom. Díaz maintained control through a strong state bureaucracy buttressed by the country's interdependent economic relationship with the United States.¹⁴³ For thirty years, US financial investment in the country increased, but concentration of wealth among a few local and foreign investors entrenched class stratification, and Mexico remained a poor and rural country.¹⁴⁴

Into the 1900s, the US administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft maintained interventionist policies toward Latin America.¹⁴⁵ Many Mexicans felt dissatisfied with the distribution of wealth and resentful of US support for the Díaz dictatorship. A strong, anti-US movement emerged in segments of the Mexican population.¹⁴⁶ The Mexican economy foundered; in 1910, the volatile northern region of Mexico, with its ungoverned spaces and rapid access to money and guns from the United States, fell into revolution.¹⁴⁷ By May 1911, rebel uprisings throughout the country spurred the eighty-year-old Díaz to resign. Years of violent upheaval followed. The US administrations of Taft and Woodrow Wilson, seeking to protect US business interests, intervened in multiple Mexican presidential elections.¹⁴⁸ Wilson also launched two

¹⁴³ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 54.

¹⁴⁴ David A. Shirk, *An Overview of U.S.-Mexico Border Relations* (Washington, DC: Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015), 5; and Merrill and Miró, 34-35.

¹⁴⁵ "Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 1904," US Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed January 3, 2016, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/roosevelt-and-monroe-doctrine>; and "Dollar Diplomacy, 1909-1913," US Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed January 3, 2016, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/dollar-diplo>.

¹⁴⁶ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 54.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 55; Merrill and Miró, 38-39.

punitive military expeditions in Mexico, which intensified anti-US sentiment. He ordered the first in 1914 after Mexican authorities arrested nine US soldiers for allegedly entering a prohibited zone in Tampico. The Mexican government apologized, but Wilson directed a Marine invasion at Veracruz.¹⁴⁹ Two years later, in response to Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico, Wilson sent General John Pershing’s ten-thousand man army south of the border on an unsuccessful year-long hunt for the Mexican revolutionary general.¹⁵⁰ Repeated US political interventions and military encounters led successive Mexican governments to adopt a foreign policy designed to limit US influence and “establish a sphere of autonomous action vis-à-vis the ever-more-powerful neighbor to the north.”¹⁵¹

During World War I, the 1917 Zimmerman Telegram further inflamed US-Mexican tensions. When it learned of the German cable proposing an alliance with Mexico, the US public became outraged. The secret proposal, however, also caused the US government to seriously rethink its aggressive stance toward the neighbor on its southern flank.¹⁵² Understanding the need to ensure Mexican neutrality in World War I, the Wilson administration abandoned interventionist policies and recognized the government of President Venustiano Carranza.¹⁵³ However, revolution continued in Mexico until 1920, prompting more than eight hundred thousand Mexicans to migrate to the United States.¹⁵⁴ Mexico emerged from ten years of revolution with the Constitution of

¹⁴⁹ “Timeline: U.S.-Mexico Relations, Revolution and Migration (1910-1994),” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 3, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-mexico-relations-1810-present/p19092>.

¹⁵⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, “Timeline.”

¹⁵¹ Díaz-Cayeros and Selee.

¹⁵² Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 56.

¹⁵³ Thomas G. Paterson et al., eds., *American Foreign Relations: A History*, 8th ed., vol. 1, *To 1920* (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2015), 265.

¹⁵⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, “Timeline.”

1917. This progressive document stands today. It codified the concepts of federalism, separation of powers, and a bill of rights, and it recognized social and labor rights, separation of church and state, and universal male suffrage. Sovereignty concerns are evident in the document's nationalist proclamations that limit foreign and church owned property and assert national control over Mexico's natural resources.¹⁵⁵ By 1929, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, (Institutional Revolutionary Party) emerged. This political party would lead the Mexican government for the next seven decades.

Becoming "Good Neighbors"

In 1933, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt entered office seeking to reframe US relations with Latin America. He announced his "Good Neighbor" policy, which abrogated US military intervention in Central and South America while seeking to advance US economic interests and build a hemispheric alliance against the Axis powers.¹⁵⁶ Roosevelt intended his more sophisticated approach to strengthen continental defense and "attract cooperation rather than coerce it."¹⁵⁷ Yet despite the friendlier foreign policy, many Mexican immigrants—and Mexican-Americans—faced deportation or left the United States voluntarily between 1929 and 1939 because of anti-immigrant sentiments exacerbated by job scarcity during the Great Depression.¹⁵⁸ The economic downturn also led to a sharp drop in national income in Mexico, whose economy had not fully recovered from a decade of civil war. Nonetheless, the Mexican government fueled a

¹⁵⁵ Merrill and Miró.

¹⁵⁶ "Good Neighbor Policy, 1933," US Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed January 3, 2016, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/good-neighbor>; Jorge I. Domínguez, "US-Latin American Relations during the Cold War and Its Aftermath," in *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda*, ed. Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 39.

¹⁵⁷ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 59.

¹⁵⁸ Council on Foreign Relations, "Timeline."

slow economic recovery throughout the 1930s by creating a national investment bank, accelerating land reforms, and nationalizing the railroad system.¹⁵⁹

Perhaps the first major test of the Good Neighbor policy came in 1938 when Mexico nationalized its oil industry, seizing foreign oil holdings and leading some US business leaders to call for a military response.¹⁶⁰ With the threat of war increasing in Europe, Roosevelt recognized the importance of maintaining positive relations, both to ensure US access to Mexico's natural resources and to prevent Mexico from aligning with the Axis Powers. Roosevelt supported Mexico's right to expropriate foreign oil holdings as long as the government promptly compensated the property owners, a position that earned the approval of Mexico and other Latin American nations.¹⁶¹ Negotiations over payments for expropriated property dominated the US State Department's Mexico agenda for more than three years, impeding the US military's desire to achieve a bilateral defense agreement with Mexico.¹⁶² The two governments finally signed a settlement in November 1941 to compensate US oil investors. Mexican foreign minister Ezequiel Padilla, a Pan-Americanist who brokered the deal, praised the agreement as a "clean sweep of the irritation and barriers that had lasted for decades...and one of the most eloquent demonstrations of the spirit of the new America."¹⁶³ In 1945, Padilla attempted a presidential bid in Mexico, but political opponents scuttled his campaign by charging he was too close to the United States.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Merrill and Miró, 146.

¹⁶⁰ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 59.

¹⁶¹ Ibid; and "Mexican Expropriation of Foreign Oil, 1938," US Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed January 4, 2016, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/mexican-oil>.

¹⁶² Conn and Fairchild, 339.

¹⁶³ Conn and Fairchild, 337.

¹⁶⁴ *Time*, Padilla Out, July 23, 1945, 52.

Padilla's political career was the victim of anti-US sentiment, which would continue bubbling in Mexico.

Roosevelt's more respectful approach to relations with Mexico enabled wartime security cooperation at the highest levels of government.¹⁶⁵ After the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho severed diplomatic relations with Japan. In a radio address to his nation, Ávila Camacho announced that Mexico tied its destiny to the United States in "intimate collaboration that may serve to link together in solidarity the action taken by all the Americas."¹⁶⁶ In May 1942, the German sinking of two oil tankers in the Gulf of Mexico led the Mexican government to declare war on the Axis Powers.¹⁶⁷ Mexico subsequently allowed the US military to use ports and airfields on Mexican soil. The United States offered lend-lease equipment and materiel to Mexico, and Mexican pilots trained in the United States and flew missions alongside their US counterparts in the Philippines.¹⁶⁸ The Mexican government allowed US military mechanics to remain at Mexican airfields, but only in civilian clothes as employees of Pan American Airways.¹⁶⁹ More importantly for post-war cooperation, the two nations formed the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission. Much like the Canadian-US Permanent Joint Board on Defense, the US-Mexico commission reported directly to national political leaders and coordinated on joint defense issues.¹⁷⁰ Although they did not designate the joint commission a permanent body, the two countries made plans in 1945 to continue the meetings into the postwar

¹⁶⁵ Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 57.

¹⁶⁶ Conn and Fairchild, 331.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 348.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 341-351; Merrill and Miró, 289; Kilroy, Rodríguez, and Hataley, 60.

¹⁶⁹ Conn and Fairchild, 347.

¹⁷⁰ Conn and Fairchild, 342.

years.¹⁷¹ Additionally, both the United States and Mexico joined seventeen other signatories of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The mutual defense arrangement proclaimed that an attack on one state by an American or foreign nation would be considered an attack on all.¹⁷² The postwar treaty was a manifestation of the US Cold War policy intended to prevent Latin American nations from falling prey to Soviet influence.¹⁷³

The start of the Cold War coincided the strongest economic expansion in Mexico's history.¹⁷⁴ The United States, meanwhile, sought bilateral defense arrangements in the Western Hemisphere that would keep the Soviet Union and Europe at bay. In 1952, the United States proposed an agreement with Mexico that offered military aid if the Mexican government signed a "Defense of Democracy" clause and agreed to commit troops to fight on foreign soil under certain circumstances.¹⁷⁵ Mexico rejected the proposal. The Mexican people had no appetite for following the United States into regional conflicts—perhaps not surprising given the country's history of repeated invasion. Additionally, the Mexican government tended to view leftism in other countries through the lens of its revolutionary history, seeing these movements as nationalist and popular rather than dangerous and radical.¹⁷⁶ From that point forward, security cooperation ceased. Mexico

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 363. The governments conducted Joint Defense Commission meetings for more than forty years before replacing them with recurring Joint Staff Talks, which still occur today.

¹⁷² "The Rio Pact at a Glance," *New York Times*, April 21, 1982, accessed January 6, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/21/world/the-rio-pact-at-a-glance.html>; "Multilateral Treaties B-29: Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)," Organization of American States Department of International Law, accessed January 6, 2016, <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-29.html>.

¹⁷³ Allen Wells, "Latin America during the Cold War," Primary Source, May 27, 2015, accessed January 31, 2016, <http://resources.primarysource.org/content.php?pid=86804&sid=645699>.

¹⁷⁴ Díaz-Cayeros and Selee.

¹⁷⁵ Jonathan Agustín González Torres, "U.S.-Mexico Military Cooperation: From World War II to the Mérida Initiative," Americas Program, October 12, 2010, accessed January 31, 2016, <http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/3365>

¹⁷⁶ Levy and Bruhn, 188.

refused US military aid, declined participation in joint exercises, and forbade US troops from entering Mexican territory. The once-promising military-to-military relationship diminished to include only annual events such as joint staff talks and the Fifth Army Inter-American Relations Program as well as limited training of Mexican officers and soldiers at US military institutions.¹⁷⁷

Economic Interdependence

During World War II, labor shortages led the United States to admit Mexican temporary workers into the country. A repatriation program followed in the 1950s and 1960s, and more than one million Mexicans forcibly or voluntarily left the United States. A large jobless population formed in northern Mexico, with unemployment rates rising as high as fifty percent in border cities such as Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana, and Mexicali.¹⁷⁸ To address unemployment in the historically volatile border region, the Mexican government instituted a series of economic development programs.¹⁷⁹ In particular, the Program for the Use of Excess Manpower in the Border Region (*Programa de Aprovechamiento de la Mano de Obra sobrante a lo largo de la Frontera con Estados Unidos*), helped spur the growth in the 1960s of *maquiladoras*, factories in Mexican border towns that enjoy special tax breaks.¹⁸⁰ In these factories, laborers in Mexico assembled goods destined for US markets using materials imported duty-free from the United States. The United States charged duties on the finished imports based only on the value added by Mexican costs. This border industrialization effort changed US investment in Mexico from an extractive

¹⁷⁷ Brian Woolworth, “Enhancing North American Security through Military to Military Relationships,” in *Mexican Cartel Essays and Notes: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical*, ed. Robert J. Bunker (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, Inc., 2013), 173-75.

¹⁷⁸ Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen, “The Origins of the Maquila Industry in Mexico,” *Comercio Exterior* 53, no. 11 (November 2003).

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Taylor Hansen.

model to one focused on assembly and production. It also “constituted a reversal of the traditional Mexican policy of attempting to bolster the northern border economy against US economic penetration and dominance.”¹⁸¹ Northern Mexican cities grew in size and cross-border trade surged, further increasing US-Mexico economic and cultural ties in the border region.¹⁸²

Newly discovered oil fields in the 1970s led the Mexican government of José López Portillo to borrow huge sums of foreign capital to develop the resource. However, falling oil prices and rising inflation in the early 1980s created economic stagnation and high unemployment in the now deeply indebted country.¹⁸³ A half-century of one-party rule resulted in an inefficient, “inward-looking, oil-dominated economy”¹⁸⁴ in which state-sponsored monopolies employed nearly one million Mexicans and provided patronage opportunities for party officials and union members. Unable to meet its debts, Mexico suffered a financial crisis. Assuming office in 1988, Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari recognized that the government could no longer view political sovereignty and economic dependence as contradictory; national development required increased integration into the world, specifically with the United States.¹⁸⁵ The government took steps to “liberalize its economy and democratize its politics to get closer to its neighbor.”¹⁸⁶ Mexico privatized a range of industries including telecommunications, steel, railroad, airlines,

¹⁸¹ Taylor Hansen.

¹⁸² Council on Foreign Relations, “Timeline.”

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Shannon K. O’Neil, “Mexico Makes It,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 2013, 52-63.

¹⁸⁵ Levy and Bruhn, 194.

¹⁸⁶ Luis Rubio, *Mexico Matters: Change in Mexico and Its Impact upon the United States* (Washington, DC: Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 12, 2013), v.

electricity and natural gas, insurance and banking systems.¹⁸⁷ Salinas also proposed a free trade pact with the United States. Subsequent talks led to the North American Free Trade Agreement, which became the “cornerstone of [Mexico’s] democratization and liberalization process.”¹⁸⁸ The *maquiladoras* of the 1960s matured into today’s cross-border regional supply chains and a more sophisticated manufacturing process called production sharing. One study estimates that one in every twenty-four US workers depends on the production-sharing process, in which raw materials, parts, and partially assembled goods cross the border multiple times during the manufacturing process.¹⁸⁹

Today, the United States is, by far, Mexico’s largest trading partner, and Mexico buys more US products than any country except Canada.¹⁹⁰ Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto and US President Barack Obama pledged to work together to make their economies even more competitive around the world. They announced in January 2013 the establishment of bilateral forums to coordinate trade policy, foster economic growth, and develop a shared vision for education, innovation, and research.¹⁹¹ Policy-level coordination across these issue areas now occurs through new mechanisms such as the cabinet-level High Level Economic Dialogue; the Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Research and Innovation; the Mexico United States Entrepreneurship and Innovation Council; and the Repatriation Strategy and Policy Executive

¹⁸⁷ Shannon K. O’Neil, “Mexico: Development and Democracy at a Crossroads,” Council on Foreign Relations, February, 2011, accessed February 6, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-development-democracy-crossroads/p24089>.

¹⁸⁸ Rubio, v.

¹⁸⁹ Wilson, 17.

¹⁹⁰ US Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Mexico.”

¹⁹¹ Donovan Slack, “Obama, Peña Nieto: Our Relationship Is about More Than Security,” *Politico44 Blog*, May 2, 2013, accessed November 1, 2015, <http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico44/2013/05/obama-peña-nieto-our-relationship-is-about-more-than-security-163151>.

Coordination Team.¹⁹² In January 2015, Peña Nieto said these efforts improve economic conditions in Mexico, which in turn raises living standards, discourages undocumented immigration to the United States, and supports his administration’s efforts to improve internal security conditions.¹⁹³ Mexico also joined the United States and Canada in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations. The trade deal finalized in October 2015 signals Mexico’s economic strength through its willingness to compete offensively rather than defensively with China and creates both a path and incentive for additional reforms in Mexico and other Latin American countries.¹⁹⁴

Growth of Transnational Organized Crime

The post-war cycles of economic crisis and expansion also affected the business of transnational crime. Mexican crime groups such as Sinaloa, Tijuana, Juarez, and Gulf cartels originated in the 1960s when smuggling contraband goods into the United States became profitable, and corrupt state security forces provided protection from prosecution and rivals.¹⁹⁵ In the 1970s and 1980s, cocaine began transiting Mexico from Central America. Mexican crime groups expanded from “family businesses to small armies,”¹⁹⁶ growing more sophisticated and creating their own security forces as they competed for markets and territories. The groups hired former guerrillas and mercenaries—veterans of the wars in Central and South America—who

¹⁹² Duncan.

¹⁹³ Enrique Peña Nieto, “Why the U.S.-Mexico Relationship Matters,” *Politico*, January 6, 2015, 1, accessed November 1, 2015, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/us-mexico-relationship-enrique-pea-nieto-113980>.

¹⁹⁴ Jude Webber, Andres Schipani, and Benedict Mander, “Latin America Hails TPP Trade Opening,” *Financial Times*, October 6, 2015, accessed December 26, 2015, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e01c1fe0-6bb0-11e5-8608-a0853fb4e1fe.html>.

¹⁹⁵ Dudley, 4.

¹⁹⁶ Dudley, 4.

employed military training, organization, equipment, and tactics. To maintain these expensive armies, the crime groups secured territories, or *plazas*, where they could impose tolls or taxes (*piso*) on the activities of other criminal organizations operating in those areas.¹⁹⁷ Collecting *piso* serves as a significant revenue stream for the dominant crime group, which claims up to half the value of the contraband moving through its corridor.¹⁹⁸ Today, nearly all of the cocaine and a significant amount of heroin that enters the United States passes through Mexico, and Mexico remains the primary foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamines destined for the United States.¹⁹⁹ Meanwhile, the United States perpetuates the narcotics industry not only through its market for drugs, but also from the tide of cash and the “iron river” of weapons streaming south.²⁰⁰

Violence and corruption remain major concerns within Mexico. An estimated eighty thousand people died in Mexico from 2006 to 2015, and more than twenty-six thousand people went missing, although authorities do not know how many of the disappearances resulted from organized crime activities.²⁰¹ Crime groups in Mexico use violence in pursuit of profit rather than political change.²⁰² The most brutal violence involves securing profitable logistics hubs—ports,

¹⁹⁷ Dudley, 5.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ US Office of National Drug Control Policy, *National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013).

²⁰⁰ Hal Brands, *Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 20. More than 73,600 weapons seized in Mexico and traced from 2009 to 2014 originated in the United States. This number represents seventy percent of the total traced. Seventeen percent of weapons were of non-US origin, and the remaining thirteen percent were of undetermined origin. See US Government Accountability Office, *US Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), accessed March 4, 2016, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674570.pdf>.

²⁰¹ CNN.com, “Mexico Drug War Fast Facts.”

²⁰² Paul Rexton Kan, *Cartels at War: Mexico's Drug-Fueled Violence and the Threat to U.S. National Security* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2012), 113.

trade routes, and border transit areas—although crime groups also resort to bloodshed for “managing everything from marketing to public relations to human resources.”²⁰³ Much like multinational corporations, these borderless networks use supply and logistics chains, calculate risk and return on investment, seek new geographic markets and ways to cut business costs, and employ as many people as British Petroleum or Intel.²⁰⁴ Illicit profit flows, too, rival those of global corporations. Estimated earnings from drug sales to the United States range from \$19 billion to \$29 billion annually.²⁰⁵

Globally, these complex networks “insinuate themselves into the political process...through direct bribery; setting up shadow economies; infiltrating financial and security sectors; and positioning themselves as alternate providers of governance, security, services, and livelihoods.”²⁰⁶ Once embedded in the social and political fabric of a state, organized crime spreads corruption and insecurity by distorting the regular economy and fueling a feedback loop that further erodes governance and rule of law.²⁰⁷ Attempts by states to confront the threat cause the networks to undergo rapid mutations and adopt ever more effective tactics.²⁰⁸ Fluid network structures impede law enforcement efforts to infiltrate, disrupt, and dismantle conspiracies as

²⁰³ Evelyn Krache Morris, “Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels: They Aren’t Just About Mexico or Drugs Anymore,” *Foreign Policy*, December 4, 2013, 1, accessed November 13, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/04/think-again-mexican-drug-cartels/>.

²⁰⁴ Gretchen Peters, “Trans-Atlantic Dialogue: Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines” (remarks presented during the “Prevention: Combating Corruption and Denying Safe Haven” panel during the Trans-Atlantic Dialogue, Washington, DC, June 26, 2012), 1, accessed December 28, 2015, http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/Articles/Trans-Atlantic_Dialogue_Gretchen-Peters-CTP-NDU-talk.pdf.

²⁰⁵ CNN.com, “Mexico Drug War Fast Facts.”

²⁰⁶ US Office of the President, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 5.

²⁰⁷ Peters.

²⁰⁸ Fuerth.

opportunistic groups form around specific, short-term schemes or “outsource” portions of their operations to others.²⁰⁹

Although US officials worry about violence spilling over the border from Mexico, the greater threat from the US perspective lies at the nexus of transnational crime and terrorism.²¹⁰ Today’s transnational criminal elements are “fluid, striking new alliances with other networks around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including cybercrime and providing support for terrorism.”²¹¹ Meanwhile, terrorists are increasingly turning to transnational criminal organizations for financial and logistical support.²¹² Although largely opportunistic, the crime-terror nexus is critical; US officials worry about the “successful criminal transfer of [weapons of mass destruction] material to terrorists or their penetration of human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.”²¹³ There is evidence, for example, that Hezbollah worked in Latin America and with Mexican drug trafficking organizations to launder money, finance terrorism and smuggle people, and transnational criminal organizations worked with outlaw motorcycle gangs to conduct illicit activities in the United States.²¹⁴ With this

²⁰⁹ Bjelopera and Finklea, 1.

²¹⁰ Kristin L. Finklea, *Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 29, 2013). Anecdotal reports of spillover violence exist, but US federal officials refute claims of increased violent crime spilling over the border. However, they say they remain concerned about the prospect.

²¹¹ *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, 3.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid., 6.

²¹⁴ Arthur Brice, “Iran, Hezbollah Mine Latin America for Revenue, Recruits, Analysts Say,” CNN.com, June 3, 2013, accessed September 26, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/world/americas/iran-latin-america/>; Stephen D’Alfonso, “Why Organized Crime and Terror Groups Are Converging,” September 4, 2014, accessed September 3, 2015, <https://securityintelligence.com/why-organized-crime-and-terror-groups-are-converging/>.

understanding of the threat within the Mexican-US context, this monograph now considers how the nature of the threat shaped the evolution of the bilateral security relationship.

The US-Mexico Security Cooperation Structure

The convergence of economic and security interests preceding World War II, and the modern imperative for Mexico to liberalize its economy and address transnational crime, created opportunities for the United States and Mexico to increase security cooperation. During the Second World War, both countries declared war on the Axis powers. The existential nature of the threat of war led to broad cooperative efforts such as base sharing, bilateral sales of natural resources and materiel, combined training, units flying side-by-side in the Pacific, and even the stationing of US troops in Mexico, albeit dressed as civilian mechanics. With the defeat of Axis powers and a surging economy, Mexico again feared US intentions, and the security relationship cooled.

Within the last few decades, social, economic, and security conditions in Mexico changed, again creating opportunities for greater cooperation with the United States. In the security realm, these conditions led the two countries to establish the Mérida Initiative as a cooperative framework and to create institutions that coordinate policy and strategy. At the level of the means, however, the two nations rely primarily on existing national law enforcement agencies with support of the military to carry out strategy. The insidious nature of the threat failed to encourage creation of a bilateral institution to coordinate the means. This discussion, then, naturally leads to the third question: How effective is the current Mexico-US structure at coordinating policy, strategy, and means in response to the threat?

At the political level, once rare presidential meetings now occur frequently, and presidential representatives meet annually to coordinate policy through the US-Mexico Security Coordination Group.²¹⁵ The State Department, through its Embassy in Mexico City, leads the US

²¹⁵ Levy and Bruhn, 30. According to data compiled from <https://www.whitehouse.gov> and <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov>, Mexican and US presidents met at least eleven

effort to coordinate bilateral strategies that guide implementation of the Mérida Initiative. In 2010, the two countries established the High Level Consultative Group, an annual meeting of US and Mexican cabinet-level officials that sets strategic direction and reaffirms the commitment and willingness of both governments to continue the partnership.²¹⁶ The group's meeting in 2011 established or affirmed fourteen priorities across the four pillars of the Mérida Initiative. The broad approaches included improving intelligence sharing; increasing efforts to counter illicit weapons trafficking; accelerating justice system reforms; developing a coordinated investigative strategy to enhance law enforcement cooperation in the border region; and initiating a binational narcotics demand reduction study.²¹⁷

This guidance frames the activities of the Policy Coordination Group. National security representatives from both countries chair the group. The offices of the ambassadors serve as secretariats, and assistant secretaries from various agencies sit as members.²¹⁸ This group develops bilateral strategy and strategic goals for implementing the Mérida Initiative.²¹⁹ These two organizations, then, perform the policy and strategy coordination functions similar to those of the US-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense and the US-Canada Military Cooperation Committee. Other Mexico-US bodies perform administrative functions such as facilitating

times from 2009 to 2015. Meetings occurred in January, April and August 2009; May 2010; March 2011; April, June, and November 2012; May 2013; February 2014; and January 2015. These include separate bilateral discussions held in conjunction with other multilateral meetings. The White House also published readouts of bilateral presidential telephone calls in January and July 2014 and September 2015.

²¹⁶ US Government Accountability Office, *Mérida Initiative*, 32.

²¹⁷ “Joint Statement on U.S.-Mexico Mérida High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation against Transnational Criminal Organizations,” Embajada de México en Estados Unidos, April 29, 2011, accessed February 6, 2016, <http://embamex.sre.gob.mx/eua/index.php/en/comunicados2011/483-declaracion-conjunta-grupo-de-alto-nivel>.

²¹⁸ US Government Accountability Office, *Mérida Initiative*, 32.

²¹⁹ US Government Accountability Office, *Mérida Initiative*, 32-33.

equipment transfers and coordinating training programs while others focus on specific issues areas such as reducing violence in key border areas.²²⁰

Despite these mechanisms to coordinate policy and strategy, US-Mexico security coordination at the level of the means remains largely stove-piped: the myriad agencies on both sides of the border report to their respective headquarters in their national capitals. Within these “stove-pipes,” agencies employ diverse means, including law enforcement operations, investigations, and military action as each country’s laws permit. Much of the regional, interagency, and cross-border cooperation remains personality-dependent and occurs in an ad hoc fashion (see Figure 3). A 2016 Congressional Research Service report notes that much more remains to be done to improve cross-border law enforcement operations and investigations.²²¹ Having identified the gap in coordinating bilateral security means to address the transnational organized crime threat, this paper now considers how a NORAD-like structure can better coordinate the means of Mexico-US security cooperation.

²²⁰ The Road to the High Level Consultative Group Meeting,” US Embassy Mexico City, accessed February 6, 2016, http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/merida/emerida_factsheet_roadtothehighlevelroupmeeting.html; and “Mérida Initiative Bilateral Implementation Office Opens,” US Department of State, August 31, 2010, accessed February 6, 2016, <http://m.state.gov/md146528.htm>.

²²¹ Clare Ribando-Seelke and Kristin Finklea, *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 10.




Figure 3. Conceptualization of Mexico-US Security Coordination Structure

Source: Created by author.

Section Three: Applying the NORAD Model to US-Mexico Security Cooperation

Despite the significant barriers to cooperation, the existing structure achieves some level of agency coordination. Across multiple agencies, increased information sharing allowed the US and Mexican governments to develop trusted traveler programs, better target money laundering and financial crimes, and improve capacity to interdict weapons of mass destruction.²²² Military engagements increased significantly in the last decade.²²³ Lieutenant General Perry Wiggins, the

²²² “Western Hemisphere Overview, Country Reports on Terrorism,” US Department of State, 2013, accessed February 11, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224825.htm>.

²²³ Roderic Ai Camp, “Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges,” in *Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime*, ed. Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010), 291-325.

commander of US Army North (Fifth Army), maintains a strong relationship with Mexico's defense chief, General Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda.²²⁴ The two militaries now enjoy a high level of cooperation in the areas of professional military education, training, and operational collaboration.²²⁵ In an unprecedented move, Mexico approached the US Department of Defense to procure more than \$1 billion in trucks, helicopters, and other acquisitions, a one-hundred-fold increase from previous years.²²⁶ United States Northern Command, Army North's higher headquarters and the combatant command responsible for partnering with North America's militaries, oversaw a \$15 million budget in 2014 for Mexico security cooperation, up from \$3 million in 2009.²²⁷ Additionally, Northern Command and its components conducted 150 military-to-military events and exercises in 2014 involving 3,000 Mexican soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines.²²⁸

In the US domestic law enforcement realm, the Department of Homeland Security created three interagency task forces, incorporating elements from sixteen agencies including the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Citizenship and Immigration Services. One organization, Joint Task Force West, focuses on the US West Coast and Southwest land border. Their co-location with Army North increases opportunities for

²²⁴ Evan Ellis, "El Chapo and the Evolution of the Mexico-U.S. Relationship," Latin America Goes Global, January 19, 2016, accessed February 6, 2016, <http://latinamericagoesglobal.org/2016/01/el-chapo-and-the-evolution-of-the-mexico-u-s-relationship/>.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Admiral William E. Gortney, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee* (Colorado Springs, CO: North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, March 12, 2015), accessed March 4, 2016, http://www.norad.mil/Portals/29/Documents/Gortney_03-12-15_posture%20statement.pdf.

²²⁷ Jim Michaels, "Pentagon Expands Training of Mexican Military," *USA Today*, July 15, 2014, accessed September 4, 2015, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/07/15/mexico-drugs-us-military/12535271/>.

²²⁸ Ibid.; Gortney.

interagency and military cooperation.²²⁹ The other Homeland Security task forces include Joint Task Force East, which is responsible for the US southern maritime border and approaches and Joint Task Force Investigations, a functional organization designated to focus on investigations in support of the other task forces.²³⁰

However, a variety of systemic problems hinder coordinated employment of law enforcement and military means to address transnational organized crime. Long-standing disputes create problems between agencies of the US Department of Homeland Security that have authority to pursue counternarcotics cases and the US Drug Enforcement Administration, an agency of the Department of Justice, which maintains oversight of these investigations. In a detailed 2010 report, policy analyst Curt A. Klun documented that domestic law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border often operate autonomously, contending with overlapping jurisdictions and supported by their own authorities, procedures, and systems.²³¹ Law enforcement task forces in the United States foster some interagency coordination, but their tactical focus does not enable long-term or complex planning, their enforcement mission does not allow for a prevention-based approach, and their impact is short-lived.²³² The existing structures also frustrate effective cross-border coordination because geographic and functional boundaries, government echelons, and civilian and military authorities fail to correspond with those of the agencies across the border.²³³ These and

²²⁹ Lt. Gen. Perry Wiggins, “US Army North: Winning in a Complex Environment,” Army.mil, October 1, 2015, accessed February 11, 2016, <http://www.army.mil/article/156512/>.

²³⁰ Jeh Charles Johnson, *Memorandum on Southern Border and Approaches Campaign* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), accessed February 6, 2016, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_southern_border_campaign_plan.pdf.

²³¹ Klun, 6.

²³² Ibid., 11.

²³³ Ibid., 6.

other frictions hinder cooperation, lead to duplicative investigations, and create other operational inefficiencies.²³⁴

These well documented problems reveal the need for bilateral prioritization and coordination of limited Mexico-US means. From a theoretical perspective, neoliberal institutionalism suggests that a bilateral institution can address that problem by enabling mutual accommodation and increasing coordination. The case studies examined here indicate that for such an organization to be effective and acceptable to both the Mexican and US governments, the institution must overcome stovepipes to enable interagency cooperation, adapt to meet changing threats posed by transnational organized crime, and ensure respect for the sovereignty of both nations.

From a theoretical perspective, permanent structures such as NORAD work because they reduce the implications of “winning” in politics over the long term. Being bound by international institutions ensures that the “losses” of any member state are limited and temporary and that accepting sometime losses does not risk everything or give the “winner” a permanent advantage.²³⁵ From an empirical standpoint, the Canada-US structure is a proven model that allows the two countries to adjudicate policy, develop strategy, and coordinate means. NORAD eliminates the problem of agency stovepipes for the United States and Canada. Since its establishment in the 1950s, the command seamlessly detects, validates, and warns of attack by missiles, air and spacecraft, coordinating with a range of military and law enforcement organizations on both sides of the US-Canadian border.²³⁶ In 2006, NORAD’s charter expanded to include a maritime warning

²³⁴ US Government Accountability Office, *Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009).

²³⁵ Ikenberry, 6.

²³⁶ North American Aerospace Defense Command, “About NORAD,” accessed September 23, 2015, <http://www.norad.mil/AboutNORAD.aspx>.

mission for North America, and NORAD now assists civilian law enforcement agencies with detecting and monitoring aircraft suspected of trafficking drugs into North America as part of its aerospace control mission.²³⁷ The agreement in 2006 to make NORAD a permanent body attests to the confidence that both governments have in the organization to coordinate limited security resources across multiple agencies and employ them effectively to address a shared threat.

The evolution of NORAD demonstrates the command's flexibility to meet emerging threats. The invention of cruise missile and stealth aircraft in the 1960s and 1970s led to improved NORAD technologies for warning of missile and space attack and defending against intercontinental ballistic missiles.²³⁸ The command's mission expanded in 1988 to include detecting and tracking suspected drug-trafficking aircraft across US or Canadian borders and reporting them to law enforcement agencies.²³⁹ Subsequent NORAD plans called for improved space surveillance and enhanced ground-based radar as well as aircraft to detect missiles and fighters to defeat air-to-air threats.²⁴⁰ After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, NORAD's mission changed from only guarding the approaches to responding to threats originating within North America's air borders.²⁴¹ In 2002, the United States government designated the NORAD commander as the head of US Northern Command, a new US geographic combatant command with responsibility for US homeland defense and civil support. This new command also assumed responsibility for security cooperation with Canada, the Bahamas, and

²³⁷ North American Aerospace Defense Command, "About NORAD."

²³⁸ NORAD Office of History, *A Brief History of NORAD*, 6-7.

²³⁹ Ibid., 7.

²⁴⁰ NORAD Office of History, *A Brief History of NORAD*, 8.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

Mexico.²⁴² The history of NORAD demonstrates how such an institution can adapt over time to meet new or emerging threats.

The NORAD agreement also contains provisions to protect international sovereignty. Within the NORAD structure, Canada and the United States each retains command of their forces, but the commander exercises operational control over forces provided; that is, the commander has the power to “direct, coordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available.”²⁴³ Specific provisions constrain unilateral action, directing that the NORAD commander remain responsible to the two defense chiefs; operate according to joint air defense concepts, plans, and procedures; and consult with the two governments before releasing public information.²⁴⁴ Perhaps most importantly, the NORAD agreement includes a mutual consultation pledge—the promise by each nation for the “fullest possible consultation”²⁴⁵ on joint defense matters; such consultation occurs through diplomatic channels both as time allows during crisis and on a regular, consistent basis to the satisfaction of both countries. For more than sixty years, the bilateral institution of NORAD served the United States and Canada, fostering coordination across agencies and across borders, adapting to meet emerging threats, and employing resources effectively and efficiently to ensure the security and sovereignty of the North American partners.

²⁴² “About USNORTHCOM,” US Northern Command, accessed December 23, 2015, <http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx>.

²⁴³ Jockel, 35.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 36.

Conclusion

Global transnational organized crime is growing more complex, and governments around the world struggle to address it. Law enforcement agencies continue to “[play] by yesterday’s rules”²⁴⁶ and resort to dealing with the weakest criminals and the easiest problems. The hierarchical structures of law enforcement agencies, problems of interagency coordination, and jurisdictional and diplomatic issues all hinder efforts to counter transnational organized crime.²⁴⁷ Between the United States and Mexico, the problem of transnational organized crime is inextricably linked with border politics and the issues of trade, immigration, homeland security, drug policy, gun control, and sovereignty. Thus, the border stands as a physical boundary while also symbolizing an intellectual and emotional boundary for the two governments and their people.

The same border that hinders governments generates opportunities for enterprising crime groups. These transnational groups operate simultaneously as multinational corporations and violent armies, unimpeded by state jurisdictions or boundaries. The sophisticated networks adapt easily in pursuit of their goals. To confront these borderless networks, a bilateral institution must coordinate the law enforcement actions of both nations, adapt to meet new and emerging threats, and allow for the resolution of issues while respecting the sovereignty of both partners.

The emerging Mexico-US bilateral security structure has come a long way since the announcement of the Mérida Initiative in 2007. The presidents of both countries confer regularly, and the two countries created standing institutions to coordinate security policy and strategy. The military-to-military relationship has never been stronger. However, “integrating the options at the operational and tactical levels is difficult, for each agency has its own responsibilities....The Departments of Homeland Security, State, Justice, Treasury, Defense, and other agencies are

²⁴⁶ Bjelopera and Finklea, 1.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 23.

largely doing their own individual missions, with no one effectively in charge.”²⁴⁸ Without an institutional structure to coordinate the law enforcement and military means on both sides of the border, the effort to confront transnational organized crime results in missed opportunities and wasted resources.

This discussion of improving US-Mexico security coordination comes at a critical time of increased opportunity and increased threat for the two countries. Divergent political aims historically limited bilateral coordination efforts, and repeated US infringement of Mexican sovereignty in the 1800s and early 1900s created distrust in Mexico. For decades, Mexican politicians appealed to anti-American sentiments for domestic political purposes. Yet leaders across the Mexican political spectrum now have strong incentives to downplay such sentiments and cooperate with the United States to achieve their ambitious economic and diplomatic goals, which are tied to their domestic social and economic agendas.²⁴⁹

Likewise, the United States government recognizes that addressing increasingly complex security threats requires greater collaboration with Mexico and other partners in the Americas.²⁵⁰ The Mérida Initiative represents a historic opportunity for Mexico and the United States to move forward to address the threat of transnational organized crime. Although language and cultural differences remain today between the two neighbors, changing demographics and public attitudes portend opportunities for greater social understanding and security cooperation. The growth of the US population with ties to Mexico will increase significantly in coming years, driven more from

²⁴⁸ Deare, 9.

²⁴⁹ Brian Bow and Arturo Santa-Cruz, “Mexican Anti-Americanism and Regional Integration in North America,” *Norteamérica* 6, no. 2 (July-December 2011): 35-66, accessed November 28, 2015, <http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/namerica/v6n2/v6n2a2.pdf>.

²⁵⁰ US Office of the President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 27.

children born to Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the United States than from immigration.²⁵¹ Mexican public opinion supports cooperating with the United States; three quarters of the Mexican population say they want US help to train Mexican police and military to combat transnational organized crime, and more than half approve of the United States providing money and weapons to Mexican police and military.²⁵² A proven NORAD-like structure ensures mutual respect for sovereignty, eliminates stovepipes, adapts to changing threats, and enables prioritization of limited means on both sides of the border. Only through cooperation and the efficient and coordinated application of law enforcement and military means can Mexico and the United States hope to confront the insidious threat posed by transnational organized crime.

²⁵¹ “The Mexican-American Boom: Births Overtake Immigration,” Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends, July 14, 2011, accessed February 4, 2016, <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/07/14/the-mexican-american-boom-brbirths-overtake-immigration/>.

²⁵² Juliana Menasce Horowitz, “How Mexicans See America,” Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends, May 1, 2013, accessed March 5, 2016, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/01/how-mexicans-see-america/>.

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